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Mikheyev v. Russia: the Issue of Adequacy
in Investigating Claims of Ill-treatment
under the European Convention
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, independent observers have become
increasingly alarmed with a rapidly rising number of victims
tortured and killed at the hands of Russian law-enforcement
agents. The lack of convincing efforts on the part of the Russian
State to eradicate the problem has been particularly troubling. The
Russian government dismisses these claims as "abstract and
irrelevant."' It maintains that Russia possesses effective legal
mechanisms to protect individuals against ill-treatment. But when
one hears a story of a young victim who will never be able to walk,
have children, or go to the bathroom unaided again, one must
wonder just how effective those "legal mechanisms" are. For that
young Russian man and thousands of other criminal detainees like
him, these claims are neither abstract nor irrelevant.
That story began on September 10, 1998, when police arrested
Alexei Mikheyev and his friend Ilya Frolov in connection with the
disappearance of a teenage girl, Mariya Savelyeva.2 Savelyeva was
last seen with them in the city of Bogorodsk, Russia, on the
previous day.' Initially, both Mikheyev and Frolov denied any
involvement in her disappearance.' After being repeatedly beaten
by police investigators, Frolov agreed to sign a confession
admitting that he and Mikheyev had raped and killed Savelyeva.'
On September 19, several police and procuracy officials tortured
Mikheyev to make him corroborate Frolov's confession.' While he
1. Mikheyev v. Russia, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 100 (2005).
2. Id. T 9-10.
3. Id.
4. Id. 14-22.
5. Id. T$ 18, 43.
6. Id. $ 20.
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was sitting handcuffed on a chair, police investigators administered
electric shocks to his earlobes using metal clips wired to an
electrical box, a torture practice known as "a phone call to Putin"
(referring to Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation).
7
Unable to withstand the pain, Mikheyev agreed to confess.8 A
sheet of paper containing an unfinished passage in Mikheyev's
handwriting describing the details of Savelyeva's disappearance
would later be found in Mikheyev's police file under the title
"Voluntary Confession."9 When his tormentors left for a tea break,
half-dead Mikheyev threw himself out of the second floor window,
breaking a double-glazed window with his head."0 He fell on a
police motorcycle and broke his spine." On that same day, the
missing girl returned home unharmed: she had gone to visit a
friend without informing her parents."
The story of Alexei Mikheyev's ordeal is one of the many
recent accounts of police torture in Russia. Suffocation;
electroshock; and beatings with fists, books, and poles are some of
the means Russian police utilize to extract confessions from
criminal detainees." These practices are well-known and well-
documented both in Russia and outside its borders." Yet claims of
ill treatment are rarely investigated and offenders are rarely
prosecuted."
Without adequate investigations, however, the number of
torture cases in Russia is bound to rise. This Note argues that
Russian authorities are presently unable to conduct proper
investigations into the claims of ill treatment by law-enforcement
officials. As the holding of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in Mikheyev v. Russia reveals, this inability stems from
the unchecked power of the Russian Procuracy. The recently-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. 'I 59.
10. Interview by Amnesty Int'l with Alexei Mikheyev (Jan. 14, 2003), http:
//news.amnesty.org/mavp/mediaclip.nsf0/1963C842F62C014380256CAE00594C61.
11. Mikheyev, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 22.
12. Id. 25.
13. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Russian Federation: Beating Out "Confessions" in
Police Detention (Nov. 22, 2006), http: //news.amnesty.org/index/ENGEUR460602006
[hereinafter Russian Federation: Beating Out "Confessions"].
14. See Amnesty Int'l, Russian Federation: Torture and Forced Confessions in
Detention, Al Index EUR 46/056/2006, Nov. 2006, available at http:
//web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR460562006ENGLISHI$File/EUR4605606.pdf
[hereinafter Russian Federation: Torture and Forced Confessions].
15. Russian Federation: Beating Out "Confessions," supra note 13.
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enacted Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) vests the
Procuracy with the power to pursue criminal prosecutions and to
supervise criminal investigations. This dual power precludes any
attempts at an independent, expedient, and thorough investigation
of an ill-treatment claim.
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of Mikheyev's
struggle with Russian authorities to seek justice following the
incident. Part III will briefly discuss the new Russian CCP and the
power of the Procuracy, a governmental agency responsible for
ensuring that all State institutions as well as individuals observe
the law. Part IV will lay out the legal framework of the ECHR's
implied positive duty to investigate the violations of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Convention). Finally, Part V will provide a legal
analysis of Mikheyev v. Russia, exposing severe deficiencies in the
new Russian CCP and providing conceptual guidance for creating
a criminal justice system that is capable of effectively investigating
torture claims.
II. OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO MIKHEYEV'S ALLEGATIONS
Two days after Mikheyev jumped out of the police station
window, the procuracy office commenced a criminal investigation
into the incident. 6 The investigation ceased shortly thereafter due
to an alleged lack of evidence. 7 The investigators concluded that
Mikheyev's claim was unsubstantiated because the police officers
suspected of torturing him denied the allegations.'8 The Procuracy
promptly reopened the case only to close it again based on the
same rationale.9  During the following seven years, the
investigation was suspended, closed, and reopened twenty-three
times." On three occasions, the procuracy office denied
Mikheyev's requests to reopen his case." The investigation itself
was laden with deficiencies and omissions that will be discussed in
Part IV of this Note.
In 2001, frustrated with the Russian criminal system,
16. Mikheyev, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28.
17. Id. 34.
18. Id. 29, 35.
19. Id. $ 36.
20. Vladimir Ardayev, Chetvert Milliona Postradavshemu ot Pytok [Quarter of a
Million to a Victim of Torture], BBC RUSSIAN, Jan. 30, 2006, http: //news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
russian/russia/newsid_4663000/4663038.stm.
21. Id.
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Mikheyev filed an action with the ECHR claiming a violation of
the Convention's prohibition on torture.
2
In 2005, seven years after the incident, the Procuracy finally
brought charges against two police officers for torturing
Mikheyev.23 Other law enforcement agents involved in the matter,
including a high-ranking procuracy official, were never charged.
The Russian court found the two police officers guilty of abusing
their power and sentenced them to four years of imprisonment.24
However, in 2006, when the ECHR heard Mikheyev's case, this
judgment had not yet been made final."
Alexei Mikheyev is now permanently bedridden. 6 As a result
of his fall, he is paraplegic and suffers from severe dysfunction of
his pelvic organs.27 He requires permanent nursing care and
frequent hospital examinations. 8 In connection with the incident,
Mikheyev received a one-time insurance indemnity from the
Russian government in the amount of 60,302 Russian rubles
(about $2,250).29
III. JUSTICE IN THE RUSSIAN CRIMINAL SYSTEM
Seventy-four years of Soviet rule left Russia with a legacy of
laws that were not conceived to protect human rights, but to
perpetuate "the authoritarian power of one of the most tyrannical
regimes in the history of the world."3 Specifically, the USSR
designed criminal law to ensure the success of the prosecution
rather than to facilitate proper administration of justice.3 Under
the Soviet rule, the power of the Procuracy was nearly absolute.32
The USSR's Code of Criminal Procedure vested the Procuracy
with the dual power to supervise criminal investigations and to
22. Id.
23. Mikheyev, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. 75.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Leonard Orland, A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure
Code, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 133, 135-36 (2002).
31. Id. at 135.
32. See Lauren Chen, Comment, Power Plays: Reallocating Power Under the New
Russian Federation Code of Criminal Procedure, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 429,431
(2004).
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pursue all criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State." This
arrangement of powers created a vicious conflict of interest: a law-
enforcement agent suspected of torturing a detainee would be
prosecuted by a fellow procurator, who would also oversee the
investigation. A tortured detainee, therefore, had no real recourse
as the Soviet Procuracy regularly used its unchecked power to
shield law enforcement officers from prosecution by suppressing
the investigation into the detainee's claim.'
The enactment of the new Russian Code of Criminal
Procedure in 2002 was Russia's genuine attempt to break away
from the Soviet past. Approved by the Russian federal legislature,
the new Russian CCP was hailed as a fundamental undertaking
designed to "change a criminal justice system widely condemned
by Russians, as well as other nations, as oppressive" to a system
that facilitates protecting human rights by subjecting all of its
actors to the rule of law. 5
The new CCP makes an attempt to qualify the power of the
Procuracy. It gives investigating officers a certain degree of
autonomy. 6 In particular, the decisions affecting the execution and
direction of an investigation are now within discretion of
investigators.37 In an attempt to avoid a potential conflict of
interest, the new CCP prohibits officers involved in a current or
former tactical inquiry operation related to a case to conduct a
later inquiry of the same case."
However, the new CCP does not provide for an independent
agency to determine whether an investigation has been adequate.
Thus, the Procuracy still retains a significant amount of control
over the criminal investigation process.' The procurators initiate
investigations, assign cases, issue binding instructions to
investigators, and personally participate in inquiry operations."Moreover, investigators are required to obtain procurator's
33. Id. at 433.
34. Russian Federation: Torture and Forced Confessions, supra note 14.
35. Orland, supra note 30, at 133.
36. Chen, supra note 32, at 448.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally Paul J. De Muniz, Judicial Reform in Russia: Russia Looks to the
Past to Create a New Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. &
DIsp. RESOL. 81, 93 (2004).
40. Chen, supra note 32, at 448.
41. Id.
2007]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
consent to initiate a case or to file procedural motions in a court.42
Finally, procurators have the power to recuse and remove an
investigator from a case. 3 As a result, under the new CCP, the
investigating officers remain mere instruments of the Procuracy
rather than being independent and neutral, "information-
gatherers.""
Thus, despite the legislative efforts, the power of the
Procuracy lives on and remains largely unrestrained. A victim of
torture by law enforcement agents still has no real recourse in the
Russian criminal justice system. The Russian Procuracy still can
and often does wield its power to protect its own ranks and police
officials from investigation and prosecution with virtual impunity.45
IV. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
As the struggle of Alexei Mikheyev with the Russian
authorities reveals, the Russian criminal justice system has proven
itself incapable of providing accountability for the crimes law
enforcement officials commit against detainees. Fortunately, that
does not mean that victims are left without options. The
international legal system is designed to fill the gaps left by
national systems when domestic crimes also constitute violations
of international law. Faced with the dismal prospects of finding
justice within the Russian criminal system, thousands of victims
have turned to the European Court of Human Rights.46
A. The Convention and its Enforcer
In 1996, Russia signed the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.7 The
Convention prohibits torture in absolute terms. In particular,
Article 3 of the Convention states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.""
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Russian Federation: Torture and Forced Confessions, supra note 14.
46. Claire Bigg, Russia: Russians Increasingly Seek Redress in European Court,
RADIO FREE EUR. / RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 3, 2006, available at http:
//www.rferl.org/featuresarticle /2006/02/debl46c3-60a5-4a03-8c3d-e86a686f727a.html.
47. See Jeffrey Kahn, Note, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the
European Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human
Rights in Russia, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641, 641-42 (2002).
48. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
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Mikheyev v. Russia
Taken together with the Article l's duty "to secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" defined in the
Convention, the prohibition on torture requires all Member-States
to accept a two-prong obligation. 9 First, the parties must ensure
that individuals within their respective jurisdictions are not
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Second,
Member-States must adequately investigate and prosecute those
responsible for violations. As a member of the Convention, Russia
accepted this obligation and recognized the ECHR's authority to
ensure that Russian government observes its respective duties."
The ECHR serves as Europe's constitutional court for human
rights and remains the most important mechanism of the
Convention." It is vested with jurisdiction over "all matters
concerning the 'interpretation and application"' of the Convention
and possesses a powerful means of enforcing its decisions. 2 When
the ECHR finds a Member State in violation of the Convention,
the State's government must obey the Court's verdict." The
compliance with the ECHR's decisions has been exemplary as
Member States have consistently followed the Court's judgments
in virtually every case.'
B. Legal Background
1. General Duty to Investigate
The ECHR case law reflects the Court's awareness that a
prohibition against torture will be ineffective in practice unless
Member States are required to investigate every claim of human
rights violations.5 Hence, the ECHR may find a violation of the
Convention if a Member State fails to conduct an effective
investigation of a claim of torture by State agents. 6
3, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
49. Id. art. 1; see also Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What
It Is, How It Works, and Its Future, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 57 (2005).
50. Kahn, supra note 47, at 642.
51. Tarik Abdel-Monem, The European Court of Human Rights: Chechnya's Last
Chance?, 28 VT. L. REV. 237, 263 (2004).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 265.
54. Id. at 265-66.
55. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right and Remedy in International
Human Right Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 977, 982 (2002).
56. Id.
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The ECHR introduced the legal concept of the duty to
investigate human rights violations in McCann v. United Kingdom.
In McCann, the ECHR held that the prohibition on torture implies
a need for some form of official investigation in cases where an
individual was killed as a result of the use of force by State
agents.57 The investigation must be effective in that it should be
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the
offenders. 8 If this were not the case, State agents would be able to
abuse the rights of detained individuals within their control with
impunity.
2. Adequacy of Investigation
According to ECHR's case law, an investigation must be
adequate to be effective. In Edwards v. United Kingdom, the
ECHR noted that a duty to investigate under Article 3 "is not an
obligation of result, but of means." 9 Adequacy in this context does
not equal success. Nor does the lack of conclusion make it per se
inadequate. To be adequate, an investigation should simply
employ the means that enable investigating authorities, at least in
principle, to discover the substance of the alleged incident. It
should be capable of leading to the establishment of the relevant
facts, as well as identification and punishment of the perpetrators °
When an investigation involves a claim of torture by State
agents, adequacy necessarily entails two aspects: procedural and
substantive. Procedural adequacy requires independence of
investigation. The State must ensure that the investigation is
conducted by an independent agency in a way that guarantees its
impartiality.6' Substantive adequacy entails two additional
requirements: thoroughness and expediency. The investigating
agency must make a serious attempt to ascertain the facts leading
to the torture claim.6' The agency must not rely on hasty or ill-
founded conclusions to close its investigation or as the basis of its
57. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 161 (1995) (Grand
Chamber).
58. Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 71.
59. Id.
60. Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 124.
61. Ogur v. Turkey, 1999-11I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 85-93 (Grand Chamber); see also Gulec
v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 77-82.
62. See Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 102-06; see also Tanrikulu v.
Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1$ 101-11 (Grand Chamber).
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decisions.6" Further, the authorities must conduct all facets of the
investigation promptly and at relevant times.'
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In Mikheyev v. Russia, the ECHR confronted issues of both
procedural and substantive adequacy in the same case for the first
time. Although the Court's case law on the subject is limited, its
recent decisions provide overwhelming support for the holding in
this case.
A. Procedural Adequacy
The procedural requirement of independence is the
foundation of an adequate investigation. The ECHR has held that
independence of an investigation demands the absence of a
hierarchical or institutional connection between suspected
offenders and those who investigate them.
The ECHR articulated this view in Ogur v. Turkey, which
involved the death of a civilian in the course of a security force
operation." During the investigation, two conflicting theories of
the incident emerged. The local authorities contended that the
victim had been one of the suspected terrorists who found refuge
at a remote mining site. During an operation to capture them, the
security forces fired upon the terrorists, killing the victim.' The
victim's mother, however, claimed that her son had been one of
the guards at the mining site and that the security forces had shot
and killed him without warning."67
The institutional link between the security forces and the
investigating agency in Ogur was evident. The local governor in
charge of the security force operations also chaired the
administrative body that supervised the proceedings in the case.'
In addition, the governor was in charge of assigning an official
investigator to the claim against the security forces.69 As a member
of the police force, the investigator was a subordinate to the same
chain of command as the security forces and took his directions
63. See Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 102-06.
64. Salman v. Turkey, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 106 (Grand Chamber).
65. See Ogur, 1999-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. TT 9-15.
66. Id. 9 10.
67. Id.
68. Id. 91 91.
69. Id.
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from the very people he was investigating." As a result, he never
seemed to have had any doubt about the government's version of
the events leading to the victim's death.7' The Court concluded that
in cases where there is an evident structural link between the State
agents responsible for the investigation and those implicated in the
ill-treatment, the investigation will fail to meet the procedural
requirements of independence.'
Consequently, in Russia the dual role of the Procuracy means
that in almost every case a criminal investigation will fail to be
independent and impartial. It certainly failed in the case of Alexei
Mikheyev. On the day of the incident, Mikheyev was tortured in
the presence of senior police officers and regional procuracy
officials.73 The police referred the investigation of Mikheyev's ill-
treatment claim to the city procurator's office, which reported
directly to the regional procuracy office where one of the alleged
torturers was a high-ranking official.74
In the years that followed, the investigation remained in the
hands of the same procuracy office.75 In 2004, the case was
forwarded to a special unit that handled investigations into cases
of particular importance. 6 This unit, however, was subordinate to
the Procuracy and the case still remained within the jurisdiction of
the regional procuracy office." As a result, many essential
investigative functions in the case were entrusted to the suspects. 8
For example, the Procuracy assigned the task of finding
Mikheyev's key witness to a police officer who was actually
implicated in the incident.79 It came as no surprise that the officer
could not locate the witness despite the fact that the witness was
permanently confined to a wheelchair and rarely left his home.'
Given such an obvious hierarchical connection between the
perpetrators and the investigators, the ECHR was well-justified in
finding that the official investigation in Mikheyev was neither
independent nor impartial.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. ]93.
73. Mikheyev v. Russia, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 (2005).
74. Id. 115.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. 116.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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B. Substantive Adequacy
1. Requirement of Thoroughness
The inquiry into the adequacy of the investigation does not
end with its procedural aspect. Even a wholly independent
investigation can be inadequate if it fails to meet the two elements
of substantive adequacy: thoroughness and expediency.' In cases
of less-than-independent investigations, however, failure to meet
these elements becomes a virtual certainty. Less-than-impartial
officers have no incentive to be either thorough or expedient when
it comes to proving their own guilt.
The ECHR first introduced the requirement of thoroughness
into their determination of adequacy in Assenov and Others v.
Bulgaria. Fourteen-year-old Anton Assenov alleged that while he
had been in police custody, the officers had beaten him with
truncheons. 2 As a result, he sustained numerous injuries to his
body.3 After a short-lived inquiry into the incident, the State
investigators concluded that Assenov's injuries were caused by a
third party.' Despite the lack of evidence to support these
findings, the head of* the investigating agency closed the case,
concluding that there was no truth to Assenov's allegations.'
Although the case was later reopened, the investigators never
attempted to collect any new evidence. 6 Thus, even though the
incident had taken place in public view and no less than fifteen
people witnessed it firsthand, officials made no effort to ascertain
the truth by contacting and questioning them.7 To address this
investigative deficiency, the ECHR held that where an individual
has an arguable claim of ill treatment in violation of Article 3, the
notion of an adequate remedy requires a thorough investigation by
the State.' Any omission that potentially undermines the ability to
establish the cause of injuries or identity of the offenders will put
an investigation at risk of failing the thoroughness requirement.
Therefore State authorities must take all reasonable steps to
81. See, e.g., Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 103.
82. Id. T 9.
83. Id. T 11.
84. Id. 16.
85. Id. 12-17.
86. Id. [ 18-23.
87. Id. 103.
88. Id. 106.
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secure the evidence pertaining to the incident, including
eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence.
The Procuracy case records in Mikheyev similarly revealed a
number of significant omissions in the official investigation. First,
until 2000 every decision to reopen Mikheyev's case referred to
the "need for further and more thorough investigation. '" 89 The
officials in charge, however, frequently failed to follow these
directions." As a result, every subsequent decision to discontinue
the proceedings was based on identical questionable reasoning."
Second, even when investigators had discovered new evidence,
they had not included the new findings in their official reports.2
Thus, investigators did not disclose that they had carried out a
search of the premises where Mikheyev had been tortured.93 They
also omitted the fact that the search yielded an important piece of
evidence - Mikheyev's written confession.9'
In 2000, the investigation finally moved forward and the new
information appeared in the investigators' official reports."
However, precious time had been lost, which had an undeniably
negative impact on the accuracy and thoroughness of the
investigation.96
2. Requirement of Expediency
The second element of substantive adequacy is the
requirement of expediency. In Labita v. Italy, where the
effectiveness of the official investigation was at issue, the ECHR
emphasized the importance of a prompt reaction by State
authorities to the complaints of ill treatment. 7 In Timurtas v.
Turkey, the Court focused its attention on the unjustified delays in
conducting certain investigative measures.98
In Timurtas, the plaintiff's son disappeared within the State
penitentiary system after being arrested by the State police.9
89. Mikheyev v. Russia, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 114 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. 112.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. 112-14.
96. Id. 114.
97. See Labita v. Italy, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 133-36 (Grand Chamber).
98. See Timurtas v. Turkey, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 89.
99. Id. $ 10-22.
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Official inquiry yielded no clues as to where the plaintiff's son
was.' ° Immediately after the investigation commenced, the
plaintiff apprised the authorities of information he had obtained
through informal channels.'' The plaintiff offered statements of
several witnesses who testified that the police had transferred his
son to the Sirnak province of Turkey. 2 The witnesses had seen the
plaintiff's son firsthand at a place of detention in Sirnak."' The
plaintiff had grave reasons to worry: two years before the incident,
his other son had died while in the custody of Sirnak police.'" Yet
the authorities ignored and subsequently dismissed the witnesses'
testimonies and the father's pleas.'05 It was not until two years after
the disappearance that State authorities contacted Sirnak province
police to inquire about the fate of the plaintiff's son. '0 By that
time, however, he was nowhere to be found; his whereabouts are
unknown to this day and he is presumed dead'. "The lethargy
displayed by the investigating authorities," the Court stated in its
Timurtas decision, "poignantly bears out the importance of the
prompt judicial intervention" that may prevent life-threatening
violations of the fundamental guarantees contained in the
Convention.'
Similarly, in Mikheyev, the procuracy officials were anything
but expedient in taking a number of essential investigative
measures. They conducted a forensic medical examination of
Mikheyev more than five weeks after the alleged ill treatment.
' °9
By that time, the biological analysis that detects the invisible
injuries to the skin caused by the application of electrodes was of
no use."' Investigators did not request that Mikheyev identify the
offenders in a lineup until two years after the incident."'
Mikheyev's mother had been among the first witnesses to see him
after the incident in 1998; yet investigators did not question her
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. IT 87-90.
107. Id. 1 86.
108. Id. 89.
109. Mikheyev v. Russia, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 113 (2005).
110. Id. 1 93.
111. Id. '1113.
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until 2000.112 In 2000, the Procuracy discontinued the proceedings
based on its "findings" that Mikheyev was not a victim of torture,
but rather of his "suicidal" mental condition."3 But his psychiatric
examination was not conducted until 2001, long after the
Procuracy issued that decision."' Such blatant tardiness on the part
of investigating officers was unacceptable but inevitable: without
the oversight of an independent body, they were in no hurry to
secure evidence that would incriminate them or their fellow
officers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that
Russian authorities failed to conduct an adequate investigation
into Mikheyev's complaint of torture by State agents. "' It found
Russia in violation of Article 3 of the Convention and awarded
250,000 euros (about $325,000) in damages to Alexei Mikheyev." '
This failure of the Russian criminal justice system was to be
expected. The lack of procedural adequacy was bound to produce
a substantively inadequate outcome. Specifically, the lack of an
independent body to conduct inquiries was likely to result in an
ineffective investigation that could only yield ill-founded
conclusions. Therefore, to prevent future violations of Article 3,
Russia must fix defects in its Code of Criminal Procedure exposed
by the ECHR's holding. Stripping the Procuracy of its
unrestrained power and providing for an independent investigative
body is the first step towards guaranteeing impartiality of
inquiries. Such an independent body can potentially ensure that
investigations are conducted in the more thorough and expedient
manner.
It would be naive to expect that an injection of modern norms
and practices into its legal system can "fix" Russia overnight. In
spite of the steps Russia has made on its way to a fair and just
criminal system, the legacy of the Soviet-era view of law as a
mechanism of oppression considerably slows Russia's progress.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. 136.
116. Strasburgskiy Sud Postanovil Vyplatit 250 Tysyach Evro Rossiyaninu, Stavshemu
Invalidom Posle Pytok v Militsii [Strasburg Court Awards 250 Thousand Euros to a
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Therefore the Convention and its enforcer, the ECHR, will remain
the only effective organs for the protection of human rights of
Russian citizens for some time to come. Not only will the ECHR
provide a forum of last resort for the victims, its case law will also
serve as a conceptual guide for implementing the investigative
means that can bring the perpetrators to justice.
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